

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06  
AID-05 IGA-02 EB-07 OMB-01 COME-00 TRSE-00 MC-02  
ACDA-07 DHA-02 /082 W  
-----109549 281209Z /44

R 281026Z JUN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8814  
INFO DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ACCRA 4927

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, GH  
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY  
1979--GHANA

REF: STATE 133136

1. OUR COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED IN REFTEL.

2. US INTERESTS SERVED BY MAINTAINING A SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH GHANA: WE CONSIDER THAT  
ONE OF THE BEST WAYS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE  
MILITARY HERE (A GROUP WHICH IS PRESENTLY IN POWER AND  
WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT DIRECT OR  
INDIRECT ROLE IN GHANAIAN POLITICS) IS THROUGH THE  
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROGRAM (IMET). SINCE  
THIS PROGRAM BEGAN IN GHANA IN 1962, OVER 270 OFFICERS,  
INCLUDING HEAD OF STATE ACHEAMPONG, HAVE ATTENDED  
US SERVICE SCHOOLS. ABOUT 50 MORE WILL HAVE GRADUATED  
BY THE END OF FY 1978. OUR MODEST INVESTMENT IN THIS  
TRAINING (FY 1978 COST - \$200,000) PROVIDES US WITH  
MANY USEFUL MILITARY CONTACTS WHO WOULD BE FAR LESS  
ACCESSIBLE WERE IT NOT FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN  
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THE PROGRAM. THUS WE BELIEVE THERE ARE DEFINITE  
ADVANTAGES IN CONTINUING THE PROGRAM AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL.

3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES FOR PROGRAM: IN ADDITION TO  
ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH GHANAIAN  
OFFICERS, THE PROGRAM IS USEFUL BECAUSE IT CONTRIBUTES  
TO UPGRADING THE COUNTRY'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

MOST OFFICERS HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY ALL ASPECTS OF OUR PROGRAM AND WE BELIEVE EXPERIENCE WITH THEIR AMERICAN INSTRUCTORS AND COLLEAGUES SPURS THEM TO KEEP STANDARDS AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE ONCE THEY RETURN HOME. THE PROGRAM WHETS THE PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION OF MOST OFFICERS AND FURTHER REDUCES THE LIMITED ATTRACTIONS OF ALTERNATIVE TRAINING IN THE USSR OR EASTERN EUROPE. THE OFFICERS PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN U.S. TRAINING ARE FROM THAT GROUP OF BETTER QUALIFIED, MID-LEVEL RANKS (04, 05, AND 06) WHO ARE CLEARLY ON THE WAY UP AND USUALLY RETURN TO POSITIONS OF SOME INFLUENCE WITHIN GHANA. IT IS A DEFINITE ADVANTAGE FOR THESE OFFICERS TO HAVE A POSITIVE US ORIENTATION.

4. WHAT PRESENT AND FUTURE THREAT DOES GHANA BELIEVE IT FACES AND WHAT STRATEGIES DOES IT BELIEVE WILL BEST MEET THE THREAT? ANSWER: HEAD OF STATE ACHEAMPONG IS RIGHTLY MORE CONCERNED WITH DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO HIS RULE THAN WITH EXTERNAL THREATS, ALTHOUGH HE SEES A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEM. IN GENERAL TERMS, HE FEARS SOVIET MACHINATIONS IN AFRICA AND SUSPECTS THE USSR MAY BE TRYING TO FOMENT DISSENT IN GHANA AND THUS SPEED HIS OUSOR FROM POWER. IN REGIONAL TERMS, HE FEARS IRREDENTIST ELEMENTS IN  
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NEIGHBORING TOGO, WHICH WOULD LIKE TO RECLAIM WHAT IS NOW GHANA'S VOLTA REGION. GHANAIAAN OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE AKOSOMBO DAM, A MAJOR HYDROELECTRIC PRODUCER ON THE VOLTA RIVER, IS VULNERABLE TO AIR STRIKES (PRESUMABLY FROM TOGO) AND HAVE SOUGHT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO BOLSTER ITS ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES THROUGH GRANT AID FROM THE USSR.

5. HOW DOES EMBASSY ASSESSMENT CORRESPOND WITH OR DIFFER FROM THAT OF HOST GOVERNMENT? WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES? ANSWER: IN OUR JUDGMENT, GHANA FACES NO CURRENT OR PROJECTED EXTERNAL THREATS OF ANY CONSEQUENCE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET PLOT TO UNSEAT ACHEAMPONG. TOGO LACKS THE CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS ACROSS THE GHANA BORDER AND COULD DO ONLY LIMITED DAMAGE IN A CROSS BORDER OPERATION.

6. IN ABSENCE OF A THREAT, WHAT IS OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE? WHAT CAPABILITIES IN THE AREA COULD BECOME A THREAT IF ATTITUDES OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES CHANGE? ANSWER: OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR THE IMET PROGRAM IS GIVEN ABOVE.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES SURROUNDING GHANA--  
TOGO, UPPER VOLTA AND IVORY COAST--ARE ALL SMALL  
AND INEFFECTIVE. EVEN IF GOVERNMENTS IN THESE  
COUNTRIES BECAME HOSTILE TOWARD GHANA, THEY WOULD  
NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO DO MUCH DAMAGE.

7. WHAT TYPE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT DOES THE HOST  
COUNTRY BELIEVE IS BEST SUITED TO MEET ITS REQUIRE-  
MENTS AND THREATS? DO U.S. INTERESTS WARRANT SUPPORT  
FOR SUCH A FORCE, OR ARE THERE MORE SENSIBLE OR LESS  
COSTLY ALTERNATIVES? ANSWER: THE GOG APPEARS TO  
CONSIDER THE PRESENT ARMED FORCES STRUCTURE ADEQUATE.  
GHANA ARMED FORCES TOTAL ABOUT 16,000 OFFICERS AND MEN  
ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:  
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ARMY: (13,250) TWO BRIGADES, SIX INF BATTALIONS WITH  
NOMINAL COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND SCHOOLS.

NAVY: (1,185) TWO SMALL SHORE BASES, TEN CRAFT OF  
WHICH THE LARGEST ARE TWO SUBCHASERS.

AIR FORCE: (1,550) THIRTY THREE OPERATIONAL CRAFT  
TO INCLUDE HELICOPTERS, FOUR FOKKER F27 PROPELLER  
AIRCRAFT AND SIX MACCHI JET TRAINERS.

A THREE THOUSAND MAN BORDER GUARD FORCE MUST BE ADDED  
TO THE ARMED FORCES TOTALS DUE TO SUPPORT BY THE  
DEFENSE BUDGET. USG DOES NOT MATERIALLY SUPPORT THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ACCRA 4927

GHANA ARMED FORCES EXCEPT TO PROVIDE MODEST AMOUNTS  
OF CONUS TRAINING FOR SELECTED OFFICERS OF THE THREE  
SERVICES.

8. WHAT SPECIFIC DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES  
IS HOST GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO SEEK IN FY 1979 AND  
UNDER WHAT TYPE OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT? ANSWER: IT  
IS ANTICIPATED THAT GHANA WILL WISH TO CONTINUE THE  
SAME TYPE OF TRAINING ASSISTANCE AND AT ABOUT THE  
SAME LEVEL AS REQUESTED FOR FY 78. THIS CONSISTS  
PRIMARILY OF GRANT AID TRAINING FOR INDIVIDUAL  
OFFICERS AT CONUS MILITARY SCHOOLS ALONG WITH SOME  
SMALL FMS PURCHASED TRAINING FOR SPECIALTY COURSES.  
THERE ARE NO PRESENT INDICATIONS THAT ARMS/HARDWARE  
ARE LIKELY TO BE REQUESTED. U.S. INTERESTS, AS STATED  
ABOVE, WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SERVED BY THIS TRAINING.

9. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON GHANA'S ECONOMY IF  
THESE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES  
ARE ACQUIRED FROM THE U.S.: ANSWER: CONTINUATION OF  
THE TRAINING PROGRAM WILL HAVE A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT  
ON GHANA'S ECONOMY. GHANA HAS NO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES  
AND MUST PURCHASE ALL ARMS FROM OTHER NATIONS, BUT AS  
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THE TOTAL DEFENSE BUDGET IS ONLY SOME SEVEN PER CENT  
OF THE NATIONAL BUDGET THIS DOES NOT INDICATE  
EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURES FOR ARMS. THE AMOUNT SPENT FOR  
U.S. TRAINING IS MINISCULE.

10. HOW MANY USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL WILL  
BE REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY AND FOR HOW LONG? WHAT PROBLEMS  
CAN BE ANTICIPATED FROM ANY ADDED PRESENCE? ANSWER:  
SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED BY THE DAO.  
NO INCREASE IN STAFF WOULD BE REQUIRED.

11. TO WHAT EXTENT ARE COMPARABLE KINDS OF DEFENSE  
ARTICLES AND SERVICES AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES?  
WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACQUISITION FROM OTHER  
SOURCES IF US DENIES REQUEST? ANSWER: COMPARABLE  
TRAINING IS GENERALLY AVAILABLE FROM SOME OF THE  
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, SEVERAL OF THE NATO  
COUNTRIES AND THE USSR. GHANA WOULD LIKELY SEEK  
TRAINING ELSEWHERE, PROBABLY IN THE COMMONWEALTH, IF

DENIED U.S. SUPPORT. UNDOUBTEDLY SHE WOULD SEEK SOME SORT OF GRANT AID ARRANGEMENT BUT WHETHER SHE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN SUCH A VENTURE IS PROBLEMATICAL.

12. WHAT IS THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF SALE OR TRANSFER? NONE. NO MAJOR SALES OR TRANSFERS ARE ANTICIPATED.

13. WILL APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS AFFECT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES IN GHANA? ANSWER: THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE EMBASSY'S SUBMISSION FOR THE FY 1978 CPD. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES HERE ARE QUITE INDEPENDENT OF OUR TRAINING PROGRAM  
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AND NOT AFFECTED BY IT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY.

14. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR ENLISTING GHANA'S SUPPORT FOR A U.S. POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN TRANSFER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS? ANSWER: GHANA HAS AN AMBIVALENT STAND ON ARMS LIMITATIONS. ON THE ONE HAND, IT APPLAUDS COUNTRIES PROVIDING ARMS TO LIBERATION FORCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND HAS PRIVATELY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR PROVISION OF U.S. ARMS TO MODERATE BLACK GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA, SUCH AS ZAIRE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS A NONALIGNED THIRD WORLD COUNTRY IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FLOW OF ARMS REDUCED OR IN SOME CASES HALTED ENTIRELY (E.G., TO SOUTH AFRICA). GHANAIAN OFFICIALS HAVE PRIVATELY ENDORSED PRESIDENT CARTER'S POLICY OF RESTRAINT IN THE TRANSFER OF ARMS, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW FAR GHANA WOULD GO ON THIS SUBJECT IN TERMS OF EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL COOPERATION. GHANA'S STAND WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW THAT OF NIGERIA AND OTHER IMPORTANT LDC'S.

15. WHAT TYPES OF GRANT TRAINING SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED TO SERVE U.S. INTERESTS AS OPPOSED TO GHANA'S INTERESTS? ANSWER: U.S./GHANA INTERESTS BASICALLY COINCIDE ON TRAINING PROGRAM. BOTH ADVOCATE "PROFESSIONAL" RATHER THAN "HARDWARE" COURSES. VERY LITTLE U.S. EQUIPMENT IS USED (A FEW 1/4 TON TRUCKS AND SOME FATIGUE UNIFORMS HAVE BEEN PURCHASED) BY GHANA ARMED FORCES. NO U.S. WEAPONS ARE USED. DUE TO BUDGET AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINTS IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT GOG COULD PICK UP ANY PORTION OF THE IMET TRAINING COSTS.

16. COMMENT: I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY THE ENTREE INTO GHANAIAN MILITARY CIRCLES THAT THE IMET

PROGRAM HAS PROVIDED US. HEAD OF STATE ACHEAMPONG  
HAS OFTEN COMMENTED TO ME PERSONALLY IN THE MOST  
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FAVORABLE OF TERMS ABOUT HIS TRAINING IN THE U.S. SO  
HAVE MANY OTHER SENIOR GHANAIAAN OFFICERS. I STRONGLY  
SUPPORT GHANA'S IMET PROGRAM AS MEETING THE MUTUAL  
NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND GHANA. FOR U.S.  
IT PROVIDES AN UNPARALLELLED POINT OF CONTACT WITH  
GHANAIAAN MILITARY  
LEADERS SELECTED BY THEIR QN  
SUPERIORS FOR PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE AND PROMOTION  
PROSPECTS. IT PROVIDES THESE GHANAIAANS WITH AN  
AMERICAN EXPOSURE AND EXPERIENCE WHOSE RESULTS IN  
TERMS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICIES  
AND PEOPLE HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMINGLY POSITIVE. IN A  
COUNTRY WHOSE MILITARY PLAY A DOMINANT POLITICAL  
ROLE THIS HAS OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO U.S. INTERESTS.  
FOR GHANA IT PROVIDES A SOURCE FOR HIGH QUALITY  
TRAINING AT NEGLIGIBLE COST FOR SOME OF THEIR  
POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT LEADERS.

17. DAO CONCURS. SMITH

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## Message Attributes

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